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The suggestion is this: Simple ideas are clear and distinct (though not as vivid as their corresponding impressions) and can be combined via the various relations. Groups compiled by relating these simple ideas form mental objects. In the Fifth Replies, Descartes distinguishes between some form of understanding and a complete conception. Berkeley also distinguishes between an "idea" and a mere "notion" in the third Dialogue and the second edition of the Principles. The second step of the causal realist interpretation will be to then insist that we can at least suppose (in the technical sense) a genuine cause, even if the notion is opaque, that is, to insist that mere suppositions are fit for doxastic assent. First, the realist interpretation will hold that claims in which Hume states that we have no idea of power, and so forth, are claims about conceiving of causation. While it may be true that Hume is trying to explicate the content of the idea of causation by tracing its constituent impressions, this does not guarantee that there is a coherent idea, especially when Hume makes occasional claims that we have no idea of power, what is billiards and so forth. The first distinction is between ontological and epistemic causal claims.

What at first glance appears to be random behaviour is completely deterministic - it only seems random because imperceptible changes are making all the difference. An alternative technique, which I have not seen mentioned in the literature, is to first determine which pin stacks have security pins and which have regular pins (by picking normally and noting which stacks are false set). Since we have some notion of causation, necessary connection, and so forth, his Copy Principle demands that this idea must be traceable to impressions. Kail resists this by pointing out that Hume’s overall attitude strongly suggests that he "assumes the existence of material objects," and that Hume clearly employs the distinction and its terminology in at least one place: T 1.4.2.56; SBN 217-218. (Kail, 2007: 60) There, Hume describes a case in which philosophers develop a notion impossible to clearly and distinctly perceive, that somehow there are properties of objects independent of any perception. He announces, "To begin regularly, we must consider the idea of causation, and see from what origin it is deriv’d." (T 1.3.2.4; SBN 74, his emphasis ) Hume therefore seems to be doing epistemology rather than metaphysics.

Here, as in many other areas of his writings, he is doing his standard empiricist investigation. Over the years, the locksmithing industry has settled on a number of "standard" pick designs. That means being able to reliably pick the lock, both clockwise and counterclockwise, and being confident that you know how you opened it. You have to be prepared to pick locks in either direction. Perhaps most telling, Locke uses terminology identical to Hume’s in regard to substance, claiming we have "… He maintains, "…Hume’s Regularity theory of causation is only a theory about (E), not about (O)." (Strawson 1989: 10) Whether or not we agree that Hume limits his theory to the latter, the distinction itself is not difficult to grasp. However, the position can be rendered more plausible with the introduction of three interpretive tools whose proper utilization seems required for making a convincing realist interpretation. The epistemic interpretation of the distinction can be made more compelling by remembering what Hume is up to in the third Part of Book One of the Treatise.

In this way, the distinction may blunt the passages where Hume seems pessimistic about the content of our idea of causation. Put another way, Hume’s Copy Principle requires that our ideas derive their content from constitutive impressions. In some cases, they combine in a coherent way, forming clear and distinct complex ideas, while in other cases, the fit is not so great, either because we do not see how the constituent ideas relate, or there is something missing from our conception. The claim would then be that we can conceive distinct ideas, but only suppose incomplete notions. To return to the Fifth Replies, Descartes holds that we can believe in the existence and coherence of an infinite being with such vague ideas, implying that a clear and distinct idea is not necessary for belief. They only claim that we have no clear and distinct idea of power, or that what is clearly and distinctly conceived is merely constant conjunction. The challenge seems to amount to this: Even if the previous distinction is correct, and Hume is talking about what we can know but not necessarily what is, the causal realist holds that substantive causal connections exist beyond constant conjunction. Hume denies clear and distinct content beyond constant conjunction, but it is not obvious that he denies all content beyond constant conjunction.